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Abstract 
Africa: signs of hope? 
The dawning of the 21st century generally brought new hope to 
African leaders and countless thousands of ordinary citizens of 
many countries on the continent. The first signs of a new turn of 
events shone through by the end of the last decade of the 
previous century. This was manifested by economic growth 
rates that started to pick up in a number of African states, by 
pro-democracy movements which in country after country suc-
ceeded in replacing authoritarian regimes, and by the winding 
down and termination of some of Africa’s most devastating 
wars.  
The results of this analysis confirm the above-mentioned 
positive political, economic and conflict trends in Africa. It is 
clearly a significant turn of events given the well-known political 
and economic predicament with which Africa is struggling. 
When this negative legacy and Cold War background of Africa 
is considered, the importance of present developments is clear 
to see. The identified heightened sense of purpose among the 
leaders and peoples of Africa and the changed mood and need 
among Africans to take charge of their own future that found 
expression in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) are indeed significant and bode well for the future of 
the continent.  
A word of warning here is, however, necessary. Our conduct 
with Africa must be very cautious and we must guard against 
over-optimism and the exaggerated belief that Africa is now on 
a trajectory of sustained development and peace. We cannot 
generalise about Africa – for that the continent is just too big 
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and diverse from a geographical, cultural, economic and poli-
tical point of view. 
Opsomming 
Afrika: tekens van hoop? 
Die aanbreek van die 21e eeu het nuwe hoop en vooruitsigte vir 
Afrika se leiers en sy mense gebring. Die eerste tekens van ’n 
verandering het na vore begin tree teen die einde van die laaste 
dekade van die 20e eeu. Dit het gemanifesteer in beter ekono-
miese groeikoerse in talle Afrikastate, in pro-demokrasiebewe-
gings wat in een na die ander staat daarin geslaag het om 
outoritêre bewinde te vervang, en deur die feit dat talle van 
Afrika se ergste oorloë begin taan het en selfs stopgesit is.  
Die resultate van hierdie studie bevestig dat bogenoemde posi-
tiewe politieke, ekonomiese en konfliktendense inderdaad besig 
is om plaas te vind. Dit verteenwoordig ’n belangrike en beteke-
nisvolle verloop van gebeure, veral gegewe die bekende poli-
tieke en ontwikkelingsdilemma waarin Afrika hom sedert sy 
toetrede tot die internasionale politiek bevind. Die groter doel-
gerigtheid wat tans onder Afrikaleiers heers, asook ’n duideliker 
behoefte by gewone Afrikane om groter beheer oor hulle lewe 
en omstandighede te probeer verkry, is bemoedigend. Hierdie 
veranderde gesindheid het onder andere uitdrukking gevind in 
die Nuwe Bondgenoodskap vir Afrika se Ontwikkeling 
(NEPAD). Dit is betekenisvol en voorspel goeie dinge vir die 
toekoms.  
Met Afrika moet egter versigtig omgegaan word en daar moet 
gewaak word teen ooroptimisme en die oordrewe verwagting 
dat Afrika nou op ’n trajek van volgehoue vooruitgang en vrede 
is. Oor Afrika kan daar nie veralgemeen word nie – daarvoor is 
die kontinent uit ’n geografiese, kulturele, ekonomiese en 
politieke oogpunt net té groot en divers. 
1. Introduction 
Africa’s history since independence, and after its integration into the 
international community as a large group of developing states, was 
characterised by general political instability, low quality of go-
vernance (Mills, 2002:90) and a seemingly unending string of wars 
(international and civil) (Calderisi, 2006:4; Mkwezalamba & Chin-
yama, 2007:2). This, along with other factors like overpopulation, 
disease, unpredictable climate changes, volatile international mar-
kets and large scale corruption, have contributed vastly to the lack of 
economic growth and prosperity on the continent. This result in the 
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early 21st century of Africa being officially rated as the poorest 
continent on earth (Calderisi, 2006:87-90; Mills, 2002:86).  
It is thus quite encouraging that observers of the development 
problem in Africa recently make mention of progress being made on 
the continent regarding political and economic integration efforts. 
This observation is generally based on the role of the African Union 
(AU) and its emphasis on continental integration within the frame-
work of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
(Mkwezalamba & Chinyama, 2007:2). During the last decade certain 
changes (trends) are also being observed with regard to war and 
economic development in Africa. Comparatively, less major wars are 
occurring on a year-to-year basis and a growing number of states 
are actually achieving positive economic growth results. 
The aim of this article is to identify and analyse these changes (also 
the lessening of major wars) more closely in terms of their nature 
and the possible reason thereof. The significance of the investi-
gation lies in the reality of the generally dismal socio-economic and 
political circumstances associated with the majority of states on the 
continent. Therefore, the focus will first fall on the scale of Africa’s 
political and economic dilemma/predicament. It is only logical to 
content that the lessening, and ideally, the termination of major wars 
in Africa, is an important condition for future development and 
integration into a globalising world economy on a larger scale than is 
presently the case.  
2. The predicament of Africa 
At the start of the 21st century more than 13% of the world’s popu-
lation lived in Africa (Anon., 2008a), which gave the continent a total 
estimated population of 936 million in the year 2007. The growth 
rate of the population in Africa is 2,08% a year in contrast to the 
growth rate in Europe which is -0,01% and in Latin America where it 
is 2% (Anon., 2008b).  
At the same time, the average annual GNP growth of Africa was 
until recently only about 1% which made Africa the continent with 
the lowest economic growth rate and which has thus lagged far 
behind in modernisation (Anon., 2008a). In fact, on average by the 
middle of the present decade (2005), Africa was poorer than it was 
25 years ago. Overall, the continent experienced a growth decline 
from 5% in 1973 to 1% in 2002, concurrent with a decline in in-
vestment productivity from 25% to 5%. This makes Africa a poverty 
stricken continent with 40% of it’s sub-Saharan population living on 
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less than US$1 a day (Mills, 2002:105-106; Bank Information 
Centre, 2008). 
Any analysis of Africa’s problematic political and economic situation 
should also consider the ethnic and language diversity found on the 
continent. This can be regarded as part of the explanation for the 
political instability and lack of economic growth in Africa. In this 
regard the fact is that more than 3 000 distinct ethnic groups have 
been classified on the continent and more than 2 000 languages are 
spoken (Anon., 2008a). Seven of the ten most linguistically diverse 
countries in the world are African.  
This ethnic and language diversity in countries form the basis of 
major political and economic inequalities and power struggles, and 
of course, contribute to ethnic conflict (Kenar, 2008:8). A theory of 
conflict put together by Lakes and Rothchild (1996:42) suggested 
that in weak states (of which Africa has many)1 there is always the 
temptation for leaders and elites to act with bias, favouring a 
particular ethnic group, with the resultant protest and conflict flowing 
from that.  
Significantly, all of the above mentioned diversity are unequally 
divided and confined within the borders of 53 independent political 
entities of which less than five consist of ethnically homogeneous 
populations. In other words, the large majority of African states cre-
ated by the European colonial powers, were ethnically heteroge-
neous with initially artificial borders, which often cut across cultural, 
tribal, linguistic and religious borders. Of course, these artificial 
borders created and contributed to ethnic and religious strife and 
conflict, not only in states, but also between countries (Thomson, 
2000:13).  
Again, any attempt to picture Africa’s troubled position in the world 
will be incomplete without also mentioning two other determinants 
contributing to the continents poverty and volatility: disease and 
political instability (combined with corruption in governance). With 
regard to the issue of disease, Africa, specifically Africa south of the 
Sahara, is the region in the world most affected by HIV and AIDS 
(AVERT., 2008). It is known that the political and socio-economic 
                                      
1 Weak states are characterised by a lack of capacity for effective action across a 
range of state functions. They typically have inefficient and corrupt ad-
ministrative structures that are not capable of maintaining social order and 
personal security (Heywood, 2007:105). 
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consequences of this pandemic are devastating and far-reaching. 
For example, in many countries decades of progress made in ex-
tending life expectancy is erased. Millions of adults are dying of 
AIDS while still young and this has an impact on the labour force, 
households and enterprises, which together acted as a brake on 
economic growth and development (AVERT., 2008). 
Secondly, since independence, African states have been hampered 
by political instability, corruption, and violence. An indication of this 
is that during the period from 1960 to 2001 Africa had experienced 
145 coup plots that proceeded no further than the plot stage, 109 
coup attempts that failed, and 82 successful coups (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2002:13-14; Thomson, 2000:123). This means that few 
states in Africa have been able to sustain democratic governments. 
The political instability reflected by these statistics, together with 
poor economic performance, are further directly responsible for the 
rising trends of conflict in Africa during the last three decades 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2002:23). 
Simultaneously, corruption is costing Africa more than $148 billion a 
year, something that is manifesting itself on all levels of state life 
(Blunt, 2002:2) and which makes corruption in Africa the worst in the 
world, including widespread bribery and graft. Therefore, Calderisi 
(2006:208-209) argues that the world’s greatest gift to Africa’s 
democrats would be the prevention of the amassing of illegal for-
tunes in foreign banks by politicians and senior officials. Of course, 
this has hindered development on the continent hugely and is a 
clear indication of a failure of leadership in Africa. The seriousness 
of the issue of corruption is so majestic that it has recently been 
described by a prominent African statesman “… as a bigger threat to 
Africa’s development than Aids” (Wrong, 2005). No wonder then that 
the view developed, as Perry (2009:34) described it, that “... if Africa 
generates any kind of growth it is in suffering – and in the overseas 
aid sent to address that, now a $40 billion-a-year industry”. 
The given background and the issue-ridden condition of Africa 
reflected in the above background is so severe that it is hardly 
possible to imagine that something constructive can flow from it. And 
yet, that is exactly what started to happen less than two decades 
ago. 
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3. Manifestations of change in Africa  
Since the end of the Cold War in 1990, signs abound of a process of 
democratisation seemingly starting to take root in Africa.2 During the 
past four years (2004-2007), more than 50 democratic elections 
were held in Africa and in 2008 close to 75% of sub-Saharan states 
were classified by Freedom House3 as “free” or “partly free” (Moss, 
2008:2). This percentage of free and partly free states in Africa 
declined to 70% in 2009. In spite of this the relatively high number of 
electoral democracies in Africa points to a tendency of demo-
cratisation on the continent, a process that started to manifest itself 
towards the end of 1997. Cilliers (2009:11) confirms this inclination 
towards democracy in Africa by pointing to the same election 
statistics mentioned above and by adding the significant fact that 
most of these elections are peaceful. 
However, Diamond (2008:38-39) warns against an euphoria about 
democratic elections as such. He is of the opinion that for a country 
to be really democratic, it must have more than regular, multiparty 
elections under a civilian constitutional order. A number of countries 
in the South world4 presently regarded as democracies are actually 
not qualifying for this label because of a number of possible 
reasons: lack of freedom for the electorate to advocate, associate, 
contest, and campaign properly before a specific election; unfair and 
elite controlled electoral administrations and unbalanced access to 
the media (Diamond, 2008:39). Consequently, in many developing 
and postcommunist countries democracy is regarded as a super-
ficial phenomenon, “… blighted by multiple forms of bad gover-
nance” (Diamond, 2008:38).  
In the above criticism Diamond is actually repeating a view formerly 
expressed where he distinguishes between liberal democracy and 
mere “electoral democracy”. In liberal democracies there is “... ex-
                                      
2 Early indications of this trend was the 124 multiparty elections, 54 presidential 
and 70 legislative elections that were held by December 1997 (Esterhuysen, 
1998:43). 
3 Freedom House is an independent, New York-based, nongovernmental 
organisation that has been monitoring political rights and civil liberties worldwide 
since 1972 (Freedom house, 2009). Its ratings are widely used for discerning 
global trends in democratisation. 
4 South World or Global South is a term which is used more and more frequently 
instead of “Third World” to refer to the less-developed countries located 
primarily in the Southern hemisphere (Kegley & Wittkopf, 2004:191). 
 J.F. Kirsten 
Koers 73(4) 2008:687-700  693 
tensive provision for political and civic pluralism as well as for 
individual and group freedoms” (Burnell, 2005:187). The short-
comings of electoral democracy is described as a system where civil 
freedoms are less important and minority rights are in danger of 
being com promised.  
Apart from the indicated trend regarding democratisation and poli-
tical change in Africa there is substantial proof that Africa, until 
recently, has been going through a period of economic resurgence 
as well. The estimated annual growth rate in Africa for 2004 to 2008 
was around 6,5%, with inflation lower than 10% (Moss, 2008:2; 
Perry, 2009:34). Furthermore, the indicated success was not exclu-
sively associated with countries in Africa endowed with large oil re-
serves. About 24 sub-Saharan African countries have until recently 
been growing in excess of 5% (Moss, 2008:2). Given the interna-
tional economic downturn which started to occur in the second half 
of 2008, it can be expected that such high growth rates will not be 
sustained.  
The question is, why did economic growth started to manifest in 
Africa only during the first decade of the 21st century after more 
than 50 years of very low or no growth at all. It seems that a host of 
factors are responsible for this changed state of affairs. Firstly, there 
was a drastic rise in the price of commodities which coincided with 
macro-economic reforms inside Africa undertaken during the past 
decade. Even now, commodity prices are higher than they were in 
the 1990s (Perry, 2009:34). Secondly, the mentioned reforms was 
supported by international assistance and encouragement. This 
have brought down inflation and improved the investment climate. 
Thirdly, foreign investment in Africa picked up during the last five to 
eight years.5 This was led by oil, gas, and mining, but trends in 
other sectors, such as telecommunications, agribusiness, and 
business services were also, until recently, important determining 
factors (Moss, 2008:2). Added to this is at least some indications of 
African professionals returning to their countries of origin.  
The decline of civil and international wars in Africa during the last 
five years is also important and directly beneficial to economic deve-
lopment (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007:80). For a very long time 
                                      
5 In 2006, foreign investment in Africa reached $49 billion, overtaking foreign aid 
for the first time (Perry, 2009:34). The reason for this is relatively simple: 
economic confidence in Africa slowly improved during the last decade because 
of a decline in wars and a simultaneous growth in democracy. 
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these wars were probably the most devastating and visible destruc-
tive forces on the continent. Changes in this regard are observed, 
however, which also contributed to positive economic growth in the 
affected countries. Wars that have been terminated lead to improved 
circumstances in which large numbers of refugees and displaced 
persons can be better administered and thousands of these dis-
placed people can possibly even go back to their countries of origin. 
It is mainly because of the devastation of these wars that Africa is 
regarded as a tragedy in the modern world (Kissinger, 2001:210). 
Generally speaking, however, changed circumstances are develop-
ing in Africa which might be the start of a new phase in the con-
tinents history.  
4. Major wars in Africa 
It has been mentioned earlier that Africa’s recent history has been 
characterised by a large number of interstate and intrastate wars. 
This has indeed slowed down the spreading of democracy, eco-
nomic liberalisation and freedom in different regions of Africa (Ayit-
tey, 2006:369-372). Some of these conflicts were branded as of the 
toughest to settle in the world like the civil war in Sudan, the oldest 
conflict in Africa. In order to get a clearer perspective on major wars 
in Africa it is important to look comparatively at the global picture 
regarding this matter.  
The large majority of new conflicts after 1990 occurred in the South 
world and these were almost exclusively intrastate in nature. With 
regard to the involvement of the great powers of the North world6 in 
the conflicts of the South world their engagement were pre-
dominantly in the context of multilateral peace operations (Bailes, 
2005:15).  
Globally, seventeen major armed conflicts7 were active in 2006, of 
which three were in Africa, three in the America’s, three in the Mid-
                                      
6 A concept used to refer to the wealthy industrialised countries located primarily 
in the Northern hemisphere (Kegley & Wittkopf, 2004:17). 
7 The UCDP’s (Uppsala Conflict Data Program) definition for major armed conflict 
is used in this article, namely:  
... a contested incompatibility concerning government and/or territory 
over which the use of armed force between the military forces of two 
parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, has 
resulted in at least 1 000 battle-related deaths in a single calendar 
year (Dwan & Holmqvist, 2005: 83). 
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dle East, and seven in Asia (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007:79). For 
2005 the number of major armed conflict in Africa were also three, a 
decrease of two from 2004 (Cote d’Ivoire, the DRC, and the Sudan) 
(UN, 2005:3). Unfortunately, a number of other countries are still 
experiencing civil strife of a lower intensity, involving ethnic and 
religious violence.  
When the period of 1997-2006 is taken into account, data showed 
that Africa was the arena of fourteen major armed conflicts. In fact, 
during the two years of 1998 and 1999 the highest number of 
conflicts were fought in Africa, namely eleven in each year. This 
number went down to nine in 2000 and eight in 2001. Fortunately, 
this decline in conflict was kept up since then to the all time low of 
three in 2006 (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007:80).  
Interestingly, this decline in the number of major armed conflict in 
Africa corresponded closely with the global trend over the same 
period. Only one of the above mentioned conflicts in Africa was of 
an interstate nature – the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
(Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007:80). However, in spite of the positive 
trend observed in Africa during the last decade, it is clear that the 
continent represents one of the main areas of major armed conflict 
in the post-Cold War world.  
There is another significant aspect related to the positive trend 
mentioned, namely, that according to Harbom and Wallensteen 
(2007:80), the vast majority of the major armed conflicts in Africa in 
the period 1990-2006 concerned governmental power and were not 
conflicts between national ethnic or religious groups. On the whole, 
neither governments nor opponents challenge existing frontiers; 
what they fight about were the way in which governmental power 
were used and for what purposes. 
Again, the question arises what the possible reasons might be for 
the indicated decline of conflict in Africa. Firstly, constructive exter-
nal involvement must again be mentioned. In these cases military 
interventions by UN multilateral peacekeeping forces is an important 
factor to keep in mind as they are involved in most of these major 
conflicts (Rourke & Boyer, 2006:284). Secondly, there are the 
involvement of North world countries (especially the G-8) by way of 
diplomacy, economic investment and general foreign aid (Calderisi, 
2006:157). Because of this there is constant pressure from donor 
states for positive results, for peace and stability, economic growth 
and development. Thirdly, there are the already mentioned political 
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transformation and democratisation that took place in many African 
states during 1990-2007 (see discussion under 3). 
However, the changes taking shape in Africa’s political and eco-
nomic landscapes are by no means only externally driven. The 
impact of The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
must also be taken into account. NEPAD, as initiated by former 
President Thabo Mbeki and his fellow leaders in Africa (Presidents 
Olusegun Obasanyo of Nigeria and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal), 
assisted in creating a new perspective on the issues of the 
continent. The NEPAD undertakings to respect international stan-
dards of democracy, the institution of a peer review mechanism and 
the aim of promoting greater regional integration and trade among 
African states, for instance, are viewed as very positive objectives. 
The policy framework which NEPAD has put in place is aimed at 
accelerating economic cooperation and integration among African 
countries. In principle, this can ad to the possible improvement of a 
dire situation on the continent (Anon., 2008c). However, Ayittey 
(2006:317) does not agree with this positive assessment of NEPAD 
and regard it as “... fatally flawed in many ways”.  
In clarifying his view Ayittey (2006:317) argued that African leaders, 
through NEPAD, are actually badgering the Western world with what 
he called “... the same old colonialism claptrap”, as reasons why 
Africa has not developed sufficiently during the last 50 years. 
According to him, it is not the Western world that purposefully 
marginalised Africa, African leaders themselves have marginalised 
their continent. More than anything else, Africa’s underdevelopment 
was caused by a host of internal factors like neglect of agriculture, 
civil wars, crumbling infrastructure, and misguided socialist policies 
(Ayittey, 2006:319).  
Secondly, there is an apparent contradiction in the official NEPAD 
document when on the one hand it refers to “self-reliance” and 
“masters of their own destiny”, while on the other hand, as Ayittey 
(2006:320) observed, the NEPAD plan “... is a cleverly designed 
vehicle to extract more foreign aid and credit” from the Western 
world. Lastly, NEPAD was created without any consultation with any 
civic group on the continent. Most governments and civil society 
organisations in Africa first heard about NEPAD from the Western 
media when President Thabo Mbeki presented it at the World 
Economic Forum in 2001. This is one of the main reasons why 
Ayittey (2006:322) is of the opinion that NEPAD will not succeed as 
a development plan. 
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In spite of Ayittey’s critique it cannot be denied that NEPAD did 
indeed play a positive role in exposing Africa to the world and in 
communicating Africa’s issues and needs to the international 
community with a simultaneous successful call for foreign aid.  
The growing economic involvement in Africa of the rising Eastern 
powers, India and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), became 
more visible with each passing year since 2000. This is important 
and can be described as factors having a direct influence on conflict 
and economic changes in Africa. With regard to China’s relations 
with Africa the end of the Cold War was especially characterised by 
a massive increase in Sino-African trade and investment, which has 
made China a major player in contemporary Africa’s development 
(Naidu & Edinger, 2007:315). Between 2000 and 2005 Africa’s 
exports to China increased at an annual rate of 48%, two and a half 
times faster than the rate of the continent’s exports to the United 
States, and four times faster than the rate of its exports to the 
European Union over the same period (Broadman, 2008:95). This is 
indeed compelling evidence that Africa is now changing from an aid 
destination to business destination. 
It is unfortunate that at this point in time much of this economic 
activity between Asia and Africa involve only a few African countries 
and is focused on the extractive industries, namely oil and mining. 
Increasingly though, business from China and India are also tar-
geting other economic sectors in Africa: rapidly modernising indus-
tries, importing of Africa’s light manufactured products like house-
hold consumer goods, processed foods, and making use of services 
like tourism and telecommunications (Broadman, 2008:96). The 
important point is that African leaders fully realised that the pro-
spects created by Chinese and Indian business is contingent on the 
implementation of difficult reforms. This asks from African govern-
ments to enhance their companies’ international competetiveness, 
foster better governance, improve their countries’ financial and la-
bour markets, and attract investment in infrastructure. There is, in 
other words, pressure on Africa’s governments to stop the wars on 
the continent and to create a more stable and peaceful environment 
within which the prosperity of Africa’s population can be advanced. 
Africa’s wars have for much too long impacted negatively on itself 
and on the rest of the international community. The needless 
devastation of economies and infrastructure, the killing of thousands 
of innocent people, and the resultant poverty and refugee flows, are 
in the process of being curbed (Le Roux, 2008:19). Africa is 
changing. 
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5. Conclusion 
As the case is with many states and regions around the world Africa 
also finds itself caught up in a process of a major political and 
economic transformation as part of its post-Cold War history. 
Important aspects of this change in Africa were highlighted, namely 
political democratisation, economic development, the decline in the 
occurrence of major wars with an indication of possible reasons for 
this positive trends. However, this does not imply that peace has 
broken out all over Africa accompanied by sustained economic de-
velopment in the majority of countries. On the contrary, other types 
of political violence, like the unilateral use of armed force and 
unorganised/spontaneous public violence, are still a daily occur-
rence in many states. In some countries of Africa there are also 
violence that are not directed at the state (rebel groups fighting each 
other). The point is that these other types of violence are also 
important contributors to the lack of development on the continent. 
Historically speaking, it was the combined results of these conflicts 
that created the image of Africa as a colossal disaster.  
In the light of the discussed indications of positive developments in 
Africa during the last two decades, the temptation is high to predict 
that Africa is now on the verge of a new era in its history. And yet, 
given the many challenges that the continent is facing, and taking 
into account the present global economic downturn, pessimism is 
still high regarding Africa’s ability to grow economically in a sus-
tained way and to achieve the goals of good governance and 
responsible government.  
Still, until now, a lot of effort were put into laying the foundation of a 
more prosperous African continent. The present clear signs of Africa 
being on a positive trajectory in terms of conflict resolution, demo-
cratisation, and economic development, are a direct result of these 
peace building efforts. The final goal is positive peace in Africa, har-
mony within and between states, based on the example of the Euro-
pean Union. However, past experience has taught us that all of the 
positive developments presently experienced in Africa, are extreme-
ly fragile. It is not possible to predict the extend and sustainability of 
the positive changes taking place in Africa at the moment. Hopefully, 
African governments will continue to implement the goals they have 
set for themselves at the African Union summit of 2005 as part of 
the NEPAD scheme to reposition Africa in the world – goals like the 
active reduction of poverty, economic growth, good governance, 
strengthening of democratic institutions and working towards lasting 
peace and security across the continent (Blair, 2005:2.) Hopefully, 
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this is what is presently observed on the continent as part of a long 
term process of changing the fate of Africa’s suffering millions.  
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